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American Indians and the Bicentennial
by Richard B. Collins
The U.S. Constitution's Bicentennial,
like other patriotic observances, tends to-
ward sentimental encomiums and self-
congratulation. The opportunity to indulge
may have induced the Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court to resign in favor of
presiding over our celebrations, preferring
the framers' reflected glow to more years
of crime, school prayer, abortion and ra-
cial conflict. Justice Marshall got mostly
negative press when he opined that the
original document was a smidgen less than
perfect from the perspective of black
people and women. But his view had re-
spectful notice in American Indian papers,
where Columbus Day tends to be treated
as an occasion for mourning. As Navajo
leader Peterson Zah put it, Columbus was
supposed to have found America, when
in fact America was never lost.
The standard answer to Justice Marshall
and other grinches is that the Constitution
was as good toward blacks and women as
could have been expected under 1787 con-
ditions, that it (and the Civil War) has
provided the structure for their achieve-
ment of legal equality in our time, and
that they have shared in the stability, pro-
gress and prosperity that it has fostered.
This is a serious answer and essentially
true, although Justice Marshall's impa-
tience with the soporific saccharinity of the
current wave of framer-worship can be
readily understood. Many of those assem-
bled in Philadelphia were attended by
slaves even and as they wrote, and slavery
was peacefully ended under the British
constitutional system decades before 1865.'
INDIAN TRIBES UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION
The enduring tragedy of Indian people
in this country must give pause to any
claim of achievement for our institutions.
Yet it is hard to make out a better alterna-
tive that could realistically have been
adopted in 1787, and many worse turns
of fortune can be surmised. We had a brief
example of the ravages of unrestrained
local popular sovereignty during the Texas
Republic, when Indian tribes were de-
prived of their land and either driven out
of Texas or killed by the Rangers. 2
In the abstract, the constitutional issue
is how a small and powerless racial minor-
ity, despised by a large part of the ruling
group, can be reasonably protected in their
lives and property. Because this goal has
so seldom been achieved in human his-
tory, we should not be surprised that our
arrangements have proved imperfect.
Moreover, several of the basic institutions
of our Constitution have provided indirect
but important protections for Indian
people and for their cultural survival.
Most Americans know the broad outline
of what has happened. Treaties were made
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with Indian nations, and much that was
promised was later taken away. Frontier
wars were fought, in which some Indian
leaders achieved lasting fame as fighters
and strategists, but in the end the survi-
vors were removed to reservations, where
they and their descendants lived in poverty
or left the reservations and blended into
the general population. Reformers and
land grabbers tried to take away even the
reservations to force Indians to assimilate,
producing even greater misery. The New
Deal stopped the slide into oblivion, and
official attitudes were mixed for a time.
Since 1960, both major political parties
have supported Indian self-determination.
There has been a significant revival of
pride, improvement of legal rights, and
other social achievements among Indian
people, although great problems persist.
How important to this history, good and
bad, were the Constitution and its institu-
tions?
Myths and Realities of
Indian Treaties
It is often said that Indian treaties are
very important, and the Constitution ex-
pressly authorizes the federal government
to make treaties and to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes. 3 But these provi-
sions alone are not remarkable. Treaties
with tribes were made by our Articles of
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Confederation government, by the gov-
ernments of several of the original states
and by the British and French governments
before them. 4 The new federal govern-
ment did no more than continue an estab-
lished practice, and the Constitution sim-
ply allowed it to do so. The government
was not compelled to make treaties with
tribes, and it formally ended the practice
in 1871 . The major explicit treaty prom-
ise made to tribes was to respect and pro-
tect their land, and most of the land so
honored has since been taken away.
Yet treaties were and are very important
to Indian interests, and the Constitution is
vital to this fact. Why this is so depends
on several less obvious factors than the
words of the treaties or those of the Con-
stitution that authorized them.
A popular misconception about Indian
treaties is that our government has directly
dishonored large numbers of specific treaty
guarantees. When holders of this belief
actually read Indian treaties and review
subsequent events, they are disappointed.
The specific promises were to reserve and
protect some of the tribes' ancestral land
and to buy the rest for an agreed price. In
most cases the price was paid, and in
others the government paid later under
claims judgments of the courts. The re-
served land was subsequently taken away,
but pursuant to later treaties or other agree-
ments with the tribes. To be sure, Indian
nations did not enter these agreements free
of coercion, but even that turns out to be
less than popular history leads us to ex-
pect. Compared with, say, Brazil, the for-
mal record looks pretty good. Of course,
the formal record does not reveal many
sources of Indian suffering, such as the
ravages of European diseases and the
psychological burden of cultural hegem-
ony, but these would have come under
any likely form of government or constitu-
tion.
Land was a crucial feature of the treaties
because tribal territory is essential to tribal
existence. Loss of land has had devastat-
ing effects on some tribes, particularly
those whose economic culture depended
on migrating over large areas. But many
tribes have retained large land holdings,
and in some cases the land has proved
valuable in ways not anticipated when the
land was reserved to them. In a rough
way, the degree of social disintegration of
tribes is inversely proportional to the
adequacy of retained lands to continue tra-
ditional economic ways of life. Tribes de-
pendent on grazing, fishing or farming
have often been able to continue these pur-
suits and are better off for it. Those depen-
dent on migratory hunting have suffered
much more severely under the reservation
system because their source of self-respect
was so suddenly and completely taken
away.
What was as important as land but had
nothing to do with any specific treaty pro-
vision was the government's decision to
deal with tribes as nations rather than as
corporate owners of real estate. In other
words, the very making of treaties was at
least as important as any actual provision
in them. Recognition of tribal nationhood
implied the tribes' right to continue to
make their own internal laws as separate
societies-to continue to exist as tribes.
A crucial corollary was protection of this
right from state interference. That tribes
exercise internal sovereignty today, free
of state interference, originated with the
practice of making treaties.6
Enter the constitutional structure. The
treaties would be forgotten relics under
other forms of government. They are vital
under ours because of the Constitution: its
federal system, separation of powers, in-
dependent federal judiciary, and commit-
ment of power over Indian affairs to the
federal government rather than the states.
White settlers closest to Indian com-
munities have been the Indians' deadliest
enemies. It is no accident that Andrew
Jackson, the president most closely as-
sociated with the frontier, was also the
most harmful to tribal interests.
Dispersal of power was a fundamental
purpose of the framers, made out of the
conviction that concentrated power is in-
herently corrupting. A basic reason was
to protect minority interests from excesses
of transient democratic majorities.7 In-
dians were not one of the minorities the
framers had in mind, but they have bene-
fited from the scheme. Federal control of
Indian affairs may not have been the most
efficient arrangement, but it was much
fairer than state and local alternatives
would have been, and it was an essential
counterbalance to local power based on
proximity. Those who would take Indian
property have had to run the gauntlet of
national politics. The need for concur-
rence of two houses and the executive
makes national legislation difficult to
enact without broad political consensus,
and eastern congressmen far from the fron-
tier forced compromises that ameliorated
many harsh proposals.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"),
established to administer federal control,
has a very negative public image. It is
blamed for most failures of Indian policy
and is the focus of the many just grie-
vances of Indian people. But the BIA is
commonly charged with errors or wrongs
not of its making. The agency has had the
contradictory duties of protecting Indian
lives and property, and of carrying out
ugly political decisions of others to harm
Indians. Important decisions that harmed
Indians have rarely originated in the
bureaucracy, although it received the
blame. At times, BIA efforts to protect
Indian interests against politically power-
ful opponents have been courageous. The
agency's inevitable inefficiency and occa-
sional corruption cannot be overlooked,
and we should continue to seek proper
ways to reduce its role in favor of Indian
self-determination. But most responsibil-
ity for past injustices should be laid else-
where.
The Federal Judiciary and
Indian Law
The other structural protection for In-
dians has come from the federal judiciary
and its independent role under separation
of powers. The framers deliberately insu-
lated the judicial branch from immediate
popular control, primarily to protect the
federal government and private property
interests. 8 As owners of substantial prop-
erty, Indians have received some direct
protection from this arrangement.
More important was judicial recogni-
tion of Indian sovereignty. The conclusion
that making treaties implies national status
was one easily disregarded by occasional
politicians. President Jackson advocated
repudiation of Indian treaties because In-
dian nations were too small and weak to
justify national recognition. In the teeth
of this political wind, the Supreme Court
published its famous decisions in the
Cherokee cases. 9 The Court carefully re-
viewed and explained the logical implica-
tions of federal treaties with tribes and of
federal Indian statutes.
The words "treaty" and "nation" are
words of our own language, selected in
our diplomatic and legislative proceed-
ings, by ourselves, having each a defi-
nite and well understood meaning. We
have applied them to Indians, as we
have applied them to the other nations
of the earth. The are applied to all in
the same sense.
A governmental institution more closely
,subject to popular control would not have
reasoned so dispassionately under the
political conditions of Jackson's first term.
Another misconception abroad in some
circles is that the Supreme Court's recog-
nition of tribal nationhood has attributes
of a constitutional right immune from
popular legislative control, akin to free
speech or double jeopardy. The Court has
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casions clearly stated the contrary: that
federal legislation can eliminate tribal
sovereignty at any time." Moreover, it
has uniformly sustained federal statutes
that limit tribal powers. But the structure
of our constitutional system has prevented
the wholesale stripping of tribal rights.
The Court evolved three interpretative
rules to distance Indian sovereignty and
property from popular hostility. First, it
construed federal Indian laws and treaties
to preempt state laws very broadly, so that
those who would lawfully take from In-
dians had to deal with Washington.' 2 Sec-
ond, the federal policy recognizing tribal
nationhood, implied from the practice of
making treaties, was carried over directly
into interpretation of federal statutes and
executive orders. Thus, tribal reservations
set aside by statute or executive order are
presumed to have the same rights of self-
government and immunity from state con-
trol as reservations set aside by treaty. 13
This rule refutes another widely held mis-
understanding about Indian affairs-that
treaty rights are more significant than
other federal Indian rights. The Court
explicitly treats them alike. The treaties'
unique significance was their original role
as the source of the federal policy recog-
nizing tribal sovereignty, rather than as
the formal embodiment of that sovereignty
in any particular case.
The third rule requires that ambiguities
in Indian treaties and statutes be construed
favorably to Indians. 14 The Court expli-
citly recognizes the power of Congress to
reduce or eliminate tribal authority, but it
requires this to be done openly and clearly.
Technical dissembling by "learned law-
yers" about legislative meaning is not sus-
tained when contrary to the Indians'
reasonable expectations at the time of
making treaties or enacting statutes.' 5 This
rule has its moral roots in our highest
democratic traditions. Congress has the
power to take away Indian rights, but it
is not subject to Indians' political consent.
For much of our history, Indians could
not vote, and since they have had the vote,
they have been too few to act as a check
on congressional power.' 6 The Court's re-
quirement that Congress act clearly to im-
pair Indian interests is an important coun-
terweight to this political imbalance. Be-
cause our legislative process is so complex
and deliberate, a transient passion to
sweep away Indian rights has difficulty
becoming law, and the Court's clear-state-
ment rule augments the barrier.
There were some attempts and near
misses. The allotment scheme of 1854-
1934 was meant to force a delayed end to
tribal power by first breaking up the land
base and making Indians into family farm-
ers.' 7 It failed for complex reasons, in-
cluding massive Indian resistance. The
termination scheme of the 1950s was in-
tended to end tribal significance by cuttin
off federal protection one tribe at a time.
It was stopped and in some cases reversed
by political action before it had time to
have much impact nationally. Perhaps the
nearest brush with tribal dissolution came
during the Harding Administration, when
Albert Fall was Secretary of the Interior.
He persuaded the House of Representa-
tives to pass a bill sweeping away all fed-
eral protection of tribes, but his removal
and indictment interceded before Con-
gress could agree on a bill, and his succes-
sors repudiated the effort.19
INDIANS AND INDIVIDUALISM
What of Indian people as individuals?
What is their relation to a Constitution
grounded in the liberalism of the European
Enlightenment? Liberal individualism was
profoundly alien to tribal peoples, and that
tension has been the source of much con-
flict between Indians and whites. Well-
meaning whites have often advocated
forced assimilation of Indians to bring
them the assumed blessings of private
property and individual autonomy. Strong
Indian resistance led to distinctly illiberal
official measures to coerce, cajole or pur-
chase Indian assimilation.
Those Indian people who elected to
leave tribal societies, whether freely or
under social or economic coercion, have
individually fared much like other non-
white minorities. Under Jim Crow laws
in the South, they shared segregated in-
stitutions with blacks or in some cases
comprised a third caste. 20 Intermarriage
with whites produced a surer path out than
for blacks; many persons of Indian and
white ancestry have achieved great per-
sonal success, even in the ante-Lyndon
Johnson South. 2' The most notable exam-
ple was Hoover's vice-president, Charles
Curtis.
Under modern civil rights laws, the bar-
riers of race alone are much reduced. In-
dian people now run the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and tribes are led by college-edu-
cated members. Still another myth, widely
believed in western Europe, is that Indians
are legally confined to reservations much
as South African blacks are limited to
townships and homelands. The truth is
rather the opposite; Indian people have
fiercely resisted every government and
private blandishment to give up tribal land
and disappear into the mainstream. The
official policies that ought to be criticized
are those that have forcibly opposed con-
tinuing tribalism and have neglected reser-
vation poverty.
The relationship of Indians to United
States citizenship has had a curious his-
tory. The Constitution omitted "Indians
not taxed" from the population count used
to apportion seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives.22 This odd phrase meant, as a
practical matter, noncitizen Indians main-
taining tribal relations. The phrase was
probably chosen because the franchise in
1787 was closely associated with land
ownership, and Indians owned substantial
amounts of land. Their land was not taxed
by white governments, so this was a con-
venient way to identify their unique status.
In the 1850s, Indian citizenship became
entangled in the complexities of the Dred
Scott case. 23 A procedural issue was
whether Dred Scott, a slave from Mis-
souri, could obtain diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction in federal court. This de-
pended on whether he was born a citizen
or became a citizen during a stay in Il-
linois, a free state, or in Wisconsin Terri-
tory, also free. Chief Justice Taney con-
cluded that Scott was not a citizen, but
was not content to rest the matter on any
of several narrow grounds available to
him. He reasoned that black people were
not citizens and that neither Congress nor
the states could make them citizens. (This
had the honor of becoming the second Su-
preme Court decision to be overruled by
constitutional amendment. )24 Taney con-
trasted the status of black people with that
of Indians. They also were not citizens
under the Constitution, but Congress had
power to naturalize them and had done so
in a few treaties.
During the middle to late nineteenth
century, federal policy was to treat citizen-
ship for Indians as incompatible with tribal
membership. Citizenship was granted in
a few treaties that sought to end tribal
status altogether. 25 When the Fourteenth
Amendment made all those born in the
United States citizens, it continued the ex-
ception for "Indians not taxed." 26 In 1887,
the General Allotment Act declared In-
dians who accepted allotments to be citi-
zens and subject to state legal jurisdic-
27tion.
But only three years later congressional
policy began to shift, when Indian resi-
dents of Indian Territory were allowed to
become citizens without immediate allot-
ment or breakup of tribal government.
Congress then altered the General Allot-
ment Act to postpone citizenship, and the
Supreme Court began to recognize that
citzenship and tribal memberhip could be
compatible.29 In 1924, Congress declared
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all Indians born in the United States to be
citizens, and the statute did not alter tribal
ties; it settled the legal issue in favor of
compatibility. 30 While opponents of In-
dian rights occasionally argue that Indian
citizenship implicitly abolished tribal au-
tonomy, the courts uniformly reject the
claim. ' In short, citizenship was long
used as a government weapon against
tribalism, but once again the tribes out-
lasted official policy.
That national policy since 1960 has fa-
vored tribal self-determination may be the
result of acculturation of another sort. The
rest of us now have values less in conflict
with Indians. We have learned the value
of land in its natural state, of cutting only
the trees we need, of hunting animals in
moderation to allow regeneration. We
have learned broader religious tolerance.
We have even learned, as Indians knew,
that gaming is a natural human activity,
so we come to Indian country to play
bingo.32
COLORADO TRIBES
The Colorado history of the Constitu-
tion's impact on the fate of Indian tribes
is one of the less happy examples from
the Indian perspective. The formal land
ownership record looks typical. At the
time of substantial white settlement in the
1850s, most of the state was occupied by
three tribes. The Utes had controlled the
mountains and western valleys for cen-
turies. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes
were relatively recent owners of the east-
ern plains, having migrated from the Great
Lakes area after acquiring horses.3 3 Colo-
rado conflicts between whites and Indians
varied between the eastern and western
parts of the state, and the differences well
illustrate the significance of federal rather
than local control of Indian affairs.
The eastern land acquisition record was
not unusual. By an 1861 treaty made at
Fort Wise, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes
reserved a large tract between the Arkan-
sas River and Sand Creek and sold their
other land rights for $450,000 over fifteen
years.34 An 1867 treaty at Medicine Lodge
Creek, Kansas, ceded that reservation in
exchange for land in the western p art of
Indian Territory, now Oklahoma. They
shared the fortune of many other tribes
moved to Indian Territory from the east
and midwest. Because their buffalo hunt-
ing culture was doomed, whatever reser-
vation they retained would involve
wrenching changes that would inevitably
produce social disintegration.
The land record omits the real reason
for removal of the plains tribes from Colo-
rado-the ignominious Sand Creek Mas-
sacre, a strong candidate for the worst
atrocity by American government toward
Indian people. 36 In 1864, amid Civil War
tensions, there were unfounded rumors of
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians siding
with the South, and there were attacks by
small groups of Indians on trade routes
and farms on the plains, attacks that vio-
lated the 1861 treaty and inflamed local
passions. Governor Evans called on the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes to surrender to
the Army. Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs,
such as Left Hand, favored peace and
came to Denver with Major Wynkoop,
commander of Fort Lyon (the new name
of Fort Wise). Governor Evans told them
to surrender their bands to Wynkoop at
Fort Lyon, and they did so. The Army
told them to camp some distance from the
fort, on Sand Creek, where they under-
stood themselves to be under Army protec-
tion.
But Governor Evans had earlier taken
another measure on the erroneous assump-
tion that his surrender call would be futile.
He created a troop of 100-day citizen vol-
unteer soldiers and placed it under the
command of a politically ambitious officer
named Chivington. While Governor Evans
was in Washington, and goaded by taunts
such as the Rocky Mountain News calling
for a "few months of active extermination
of the red devils,"37 Chivington conducted
a one-day Auschwitz. He led his troop on
a surprise attack and ordered it to take no
prisoners. The order was scrupulously
obeyed, and most of those killed were
women, children, aged, crippled, or men
waving the white flag of surrender. Rape
and corpse mutilation were followed by a
ghoulish display of Indian scalps in Den-
ver. The massacre provoked several years
of warfare by surviving Cheyennes and
Arapahoes, resulting in many needless
white deaths as well.
Sand Creek was recognized as an out-
rage soon after it occurred and was offi-
cially condemned by Congress. It was a
vivid illustration of the fact that those
nearest to the Indians were most hostile
and bloody toward them. The regular
Army and officials in Washington were
usually a tempering influence on frontier
excesses. Sand Creek and the Texas ex-
perience suggest that the Indians' fate
might have been far worse under plenary
local sovereignty.
The experience of the Utes in western
Colorado was typical of federal control.
In 1868, they made a very favorable treaty
with the United States, reserving to them
most of the western quarter of the state,
including the San Juan Mountains. 38 Gold
discoveries soon led to cession pressures,
and the San Juans were sold to the govern-
ment under an 1873 agreement.3 9 In 1878,
Nathan Meeker was made agent to the
Utes at White River. Frustrated at their
failure to take up farming and schooling,
he took measures to force acceptance,
such as plowing up the Utes' horse pas-
tures. The Utes defied him, and he called
in the Army. The White River band of
Utes intercepted the Army and stopped its
advance, killed Meeker and other male
employees of the agency, and took the
women captive.
Despite the provocation of the Meeker
Massacre, the government's response,
managed from Washington rather than
Denver, was far more careful than at Sand
Creek. The military did not retaliate in
kind. In 1880, the Utes were forced or
persuaded, depending on whose view we
accept, to cede all the 1868 reservation,
except for its southern strip, in exchange
for a new reservation in central Utah. 4 1
Several bands, including the offending
White River group, were removed to the
Utah reservation, where their descendants
live today. The southern strip was the only
original Indian country left in Colorado.
Those after Indian land were not content
to leave even the southern strip of the 1868
Ute Reservation in tribal hands. After sev-
eral years of political give and take, those
Ute people who were determined to keep
common land were allowed to retain the
barren western half of the strip, now called
the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation in Mon-
tezuma County.42 The eastern half, in La
Plata and Archuleta Counties, was allotted
in severalty to Utes willing to accept allot-
ments, and the rest was opened to white
settlement. Most of the good farmland was
sold to whites. In 1934, Congress stopped
allotment and homesteading, and un-
claimed land was returned to tribal com-
mon ownership in 1938.43 The boundaries
of the eastern part, now called the South-
ern Ute Reservation, were settled by fed-
eral statute in 1984."
CONCLUSION
Over most of our history, Indians inevi-
tably have regarded the constitutional sys-
tem from the perspective of lesser evil.
From that viewpoint, the Constitution
holds up rather well. By dispersing power
broadly among competing political institu-
tions, by allocating power over Indian af-
fairs to Washington rather than the states,
and by establishing an independent federal
judiciary, the Constitution allowed most
Indian tribes to survive more than a cen-
tury and a half of popular hostility. While
1987 1583
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much hardship was endured, the record in
all probability would have been much
more negative under likely alternative
forms of government.
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